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Casenote

FAA v. Cooper: Bombarding the Privacy Act
with the "Canon of Sovereign Immunity"

I.

INTRODUCTION

Privacy is a word we hear frequently in today's technologically
advanced society. From Google Maps documenting every street in the
nation to smartphones sharing locations automatically, privacy concerns
abound. In fact, a recent Consumer Reports study found that over
seventy percent of respondents said they were very concerned about the
sharing of their personal information.' Nevertheless, these worries
seem to have fallen on deaf ears as displayed by the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision, Federal Aviation Administration v.
Cooper.2 The Court in Cooper ruled that although sharing confidential
records without a citizen's permission violated the Privacy Act of 1974
(Privacy Act),' it did not result in pecuniary loss and therefore was not

1. David Butler, Consumer Reports Survey: Most Consumers "Very Concerned" About
Online CompaniesSelling, SharingPersonalData Without Permission,CONSUMER'S UNION,
(Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core-fmanciaLservices/018390.html
(stating that seventy-one percent of respondents were "very concerned about companies
selling or sharing their information about them without their permission").
2. 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
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recoverable. 4 This decision, combined with the Court's most recent
interpretation of the Privacy Act's civil remedies provision in Doe v.
Chao,5 leaves the Privacy Act powerless to stop government agencies
from sharing personal and sensitive information without recourse or
consequence.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Stanmore Cooper had been licensed with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) as a private pilot since 1964.6 In order to fly
legally, Cooper, along with all other pilots, was required to have a pilot
certificate and medical certificate issued by the FAA.' Cooper complied
with the requirement until 1985, when he was diagnosed with a human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection and started taking antiretroviral
medications. Cooper realized that the FAA would not allow him to
renew his medical license if he disclosed his HIV-positive status, so he
chose not to reapply that year. In 1994, Cooper decided to reapply for
his medical certificate without mentioning his HIV-positive status. 8
One year later when his health deteriorated, Cooper applied for
disability benefits9 under the Social Security Act (SSA). 10 He supported
his application for disability by disclosing his HIV-positive status.
Cooper was approved for benefits and collected until 1996 when the
antiretroviral medications eased his symptoms.
Meanwhile, he
continued to renew his medical certificate every two years for the next
ten years, still omitting HIV-positive status."
In 2002, the Department of Transportation (DOT), the FAA's parent
department, launched a criminal joint investigation entitled "Operation
Safe Pilot" in which it cross-referenced a list of pilots in northern
California with the SSA's list of individuals receiving benefits. 12 The
purpose of this investigation was to identify pilots who may have
omitted information, specifically those "claiming a debilitating condition

4. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1456 (holding that "the Privacy Act does not unequivocally
authorize an award of damages for mental or emotional distress").
5. 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
6. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1446 (2012).
7. Id.; see 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(c)(1) (2012) ("A person may serve as a required pilot flight
crewmember of an aircraft only if that person holds the appropriate medical certificate
issued under part 67 of this chapter, or other documentation acceptable to the FAA, that
is in that person's physical possession or readily accessible in the aircraft.").
8. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1446.
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397mm (2006).
11. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1446.
12. Id. at 1446-47.

20131

FAA V. COOPER

787

with the SSA and claim[ing] good health to obtain a FAA medical
certificate," just as Cooper had done.' 3 Based on the report, the FAA
determined that it would not have issued a medical certificate to Cooper
had the agency known of his condition. The DOT indicted him on three
counts of making false statements to a government agency. Cooper pled
guilty to one count of making and delivering a false official writing and
was sentenced to two years of probation. He also paid a fine of
$1,000.14

After receiving his sentence, Cooper filed a civil suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging
that the FAA, DOT, and SSA violated his rights under § 552a(b) of the
Privacy Act by sharing records with one another.15 He claimed that he
suffered from severe emotional distress when the DOT revealed his HIV
status. 16 Cooper, notably, did not offer any evidence of pecuniary loss
from the invasion of privacy.17
The district court granted summary judgment against the government,
concluding that the agencies had violated the Privacy Act."8 On the
other hand, the court held that Cooper could not recover damages
because he suffered no economic harm.19 The court recognized the
government had violated the Privacy Act; however, it was unsure
20
whether or not the government's violation was intentional or willful.

The court also said that the language in the Act, particularly the term
"actual damages," was vague and ambiguous. 2' The district court cited
a narrow interpretation of the sovereign immunity waiver to support its
rationale.22
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the
United States Supreme Court's underlying doctrine of sovereign
immunity in Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertof 3 and reversed and

13. Cooper v. FAA, 816 F. Supp. 2d 778, 782 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
14. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1447.
15. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) ("No agency shall disclose any record which is
contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent
of, the individual to whom the record pertains. . .
16. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1447.
17. Cooper, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
18. Id. at 781.
19. Id. at 790.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 791.
22. Id. at 792 (quoting Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986)).
23. 553 U.S. 571 (2008).
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remanded the decision.'
The court of appeals determined that the
term "actual damages" changes meaning "with the specific statute in
which it is found."25 The Ninth Circuit considered the "text, purpose,
and structure of the Act, as well as how actual damages [have] been
construed in other closely analogous federal statutes."6 Subsequently,
it found actual damages to include mental and emotional damages, as
other alternatives did not seem "plausibl[e]. "27 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.2"
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Right to PrivacyBefore the PrivacyAct
When Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974, the right to privacy
had been recognized in America for nearly a century. The recognition
of the right to privacy by Justice Warren and Justice Brandeis in their
Harvard Law Review article in 1890 was a reaction to the use of new
technology (specifically the camera) in the media.29 The article was
written in response to a decision by the Court of Appeals of New York
to deny a remedy when someone's picture was used without his
consent.30 Slowly, over the next forty years, state courts and legislatures around the country began to recognize the invasion of privacy as
a tort. 3' Finally, by 1934, the right to privacy was generally recognized
32
in the First Restatement of Torts.
The United States Supreme Court has also addressed the right to
privacy but within the protections of the Constitution. It first addressed
the right to privacy when determining whether a state could prohibit the
use of birth control.3" In Griswold v. Connecticut,34 Justice Douglas,

24. Cooper v. FAA, 622 F.3d 1016, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3025

(2011), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012).

25. Id. at 1029.
26. Cooper v. FAA, 596 F.3d 538, 549 (9th Cir. 2010).

27. Cooper, 622 F.3d at 1034.
28. See FAA v. Cooper, 131 S.Ct. 3025 (2011).
29. Samuel D.Warren &Louis D.Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195-97 (1890).
30.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

ToRTs 849-50 (5th

ed. 1984).
31. Id. at 851; see also N.Y. CrViL RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1921); Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 216-22, 50 S.E. 68, 79-81 (1905).

32. KEETON ET AL., supranote 30, at 851 &n.15 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
§ 867 (1939)).
33. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
34. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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authoring the majority opinion, held that although the right to privacy
for married couples' use of contraception was not explicitly stated in the
bill of rights, it was a protected zone within the penumbras of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.3 5
The Court continued to expand the right to privacy in 1971 with its
opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird.36 Eisenstadt dealt with a statute
similar to the one in Griswold and prevented single individuals from
Strongly affirming the reasoning in
purchasing birth control."
Griswold, Justice Brennan stated that all individuals, married or single,
had a right to be free from "unwarranted governmental intrusion," and
limiting the purchase of birth control was a violation of privacy by the
government. 38 Then in 1973 the Court decided the controversial case,
Roe v. Wade,3" where it recognized that an anti-abortion statute
intruded upon a woman's right to privacy.4"
The Court also addressed privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment
in Katz v. United States.4 In Katz, the Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutional implications of law enforcement's use of electronic
equipment to eavesdrop on a citizen's conversations inside a public
telephone booth.4 2 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, ruled that
such data collection violated privacy rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment's unreasonable search and seizure clause.4 3 His opinion

35. Id. at 484.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people."
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
37. Id. at 441-42.
38. Id. at 453.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("Th[e] right of privacy... is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42. Id. at 349.
43. Id. at 353 ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording
the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.").
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explicitly overruled an earlier decision by the Court which held that
tapping a phone line did not constitute a search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. 4
B. The PrivacyAct and Doe v. Chao: The Rise and Fall of the Civil
Remedies Provision
The Supreme Court was not the only branch of government concerned
with protecting the right to privacy. During the 1970s, both American
citizens and Congress were worried about the growing ability of
computers to collect information.45 Watergate and the scandal that
surrounded it only fueled this fear.46 Many Americans worried that the
federal government would use computers and other technology to collect
private information.47 This fear led several congressmen to speak out
about privacy rights and how such rights should be protected. 4 In
light of these concerns, Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974 as a
way to prevent the government from unwanted intrusions into citizens'
personal lives.

44.
45.

Id.; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
See J. COMM. OF GOV'T OPERATIONS ON LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF
1974: SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY 157-163 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK];
see also Haeji Hong, Dismantlingthe PrivateEnforcement of the Privacy Act of 1974: Doe

v. Chao, 38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 72-73 (2005) ("Changing technology, i.e. computers,
facilitated the government's collection and dissemination of private information and
instigated congressional and executive concern for individual privacy.").
46. In the opening remarks when introducing the bill in the Senate, Senator Ervin
stated: "If we have learned anything in this last year of Watergate, it is that there must
be limits upon what the Government can know about each of its citizens. Each time we
give up a bit of information about ourselves to the Government, we give up some of our
freedom." SOURCE BOOK, supra note 45, at 3-4; see Alex Kardon, Damages Under the
Privacy Act: Sovereign Immunity and a Call for Legislative Reform, 34 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POLVY 705, 707 (2011) ("While the general distrust of the federal government in the
aftermath of Watergate created a political climate ripe for passing the Act, concerns about
the federal government's increasing use of computers to collect, store, manipulate, and
distribute personal information also played a role in Congress approving the Act.").
47. In debating the bill, Senator Jackson stated, "The American people are deeply
disturbed about evidence that has accumulated in recent years of widespread Government
insensitivity and disregard for the rights of individual citizens. Watergate and related
scandals have brought to light a callous disregard for the law and for the sanctity of
individual rights within the highest circles of government." SOURCE BOOK, supra note 45,
at 800.
48. Senator Huddleston stating "The individual's right to privacy has long been
recognized by the courts which have consistently protected it from both governmental and
nongovernmental intervention." SOURCE BOOK, supra note 45, at 832. See also supra notes
46-47.
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The purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974 is "to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of personal privacy by
requiring federal agencies ...

to ...

be subject to civil suit for any

damages which occur as a result of willful or intentional action which
4s
violates any individual's rights under this Act." To prevent agencies
from revealing information about individuals without their consent, the
Privacy Act provides that an agency cannot disclose information without
50
the individuals' consent except within limited exceptions. To further
strengthen the Act, Congress specifically waived sovereign immunity
51
from civil damages after laying out four categories of misconduct.

49. Cooper, 596 F.3d at 546; see also Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by
any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant
to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to
whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be--(1) to those
officers and employees of the agency which maintains the record who have a need
for the record in the performance of their duties; (2) required under section 552 of
this title; (3) for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and
described under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section; (4) to the Bureau of the Census
for purposes of planning or carrying out a census or survey or related activity
pursuant to the provisions of title 13; (5) to a recipient who has provided the
agency with advance adequate written assurance that the record will be used
solely as a statistical research or reporting record, and the record is to be
transferred in a form that is not individually identifiable; (6) to the National
Archives and Records Administration as a record which has sufficient historical
or other value to warrant its continued preservation by the United States
Government, or for evaluation by the Archivist of the United States or the
designee of the Archivist to determine whether the record has such value; (7) to
another agency or to an instrumentality of any governmental jurisdiction within
or under the control of the United States for a civil or criminal law enforcement
activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the agency or
instrumentality has made a written request to the agency which maintains the
record specifying the particular portion desired and the law enforcement activity
for which the record is sought; (8) to a person pursuant to a showing of compelling
circumstances affecting the health or safety of an individual if upon such
disclosure notification is transmitted to the last known address of such individual;
(9) to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction,
any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or
subcommittee of any such joint committee; (10) to the Comptroller General, or any
of his authorized representatives, in the course of the performance of the duties
of the Government Accountability Office; (11) pursuant to the order of a court of
competent jurisdiction; or (12) to a consumer reporting agency in accordance
with section 3711(e) of title 31.
Id.
51. Id. § 552a(g)(1).
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The civil remedies provision-the specific provision contested in Cooper-allows a complainant to recover from the United States "actual
damages sustained by the individual."5 2
The debate about the meaning of actual damages, specifically whether
they are limited to financial loss or incorporate broader losses, is not
novel. Courts across the country have addressed the question since
1983, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
interpreted the provision to include damages for mental suffering.53
However, this decision was abrogated by the Court's most recent
interpretation of the Privacy Act preceding Cooper in Doe v. Chao.54 In
Doe, Justice Souter addressed the only issue presented in the case:
whether the plaintiff must prove actual damages to qualify for the
minimum recoverable amount of $1,000." The decision in Doe profoundly affected the ruling in Cooper. One author predicted this
outcome, stating that the narrow reading of actual damages in Doe

Whenever any agency (A) makes a determination under subsection (dX3) of this
section not to amend an individual's record in accordance with his request, or fails
to make such review in conformity with that subsection; (B) refuses to comply with
an individual request under subsection (d)(1) of this section; (C) fails to maintain
any record concerning any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness,
and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination relating
to the qualifications, character, rights, or opportunities of, or benefits to the
individual that may be made on the basis of such record, and consequently a
determination is made which is adverse to the individual; or (D) fails to comply
with any other provision of this section, or any rule promulgated thereunder, in
such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual, the individual may bring
a civil action against the agency, and the district courts of the United States shall
have jurisdiction in the matters under the provisions of this subsection.
Id.
52. Id. § 552a(g)(4XA). Section 552a(gX4)(A) states:
In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (gXl)(C) or (D) of this
section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which
was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an
amount equal to the sum of-(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as
a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery
receive less than the sum of $1,000 ....
Id.
53. Johnson v. Dep't of Treasury, I.R.S., 700 F.2d 971, 972 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated
by Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004) (holding that "the term 'actual damages' under the
Privacy Act does indeed include damages for physical and mental injury for which there
is competent evidence in the record, as well as damages for out-of-pocket expenses").
54. 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
55. Id. at 616 ("The question before us is whether plaintiffs must prove some actual
damages to qualify for a minimum statutory award of $1,000.").
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56
would prove prophetic for the Court's decision in Cooper. Additionally, the Court mentioned the question surrounding the definition "actual
damages" in its Doe opinion and noted that although the lower courts
57
were split, that specific question was reserved for a later date.

C. A Concise History of the Narrow Constructionof Sovereign
Immunity
To answer the question of what "actual damages" actually means and
on which claims Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity, the
Court construed the waiver narrowly. Exactly when the idea that
waivers of sovereign immunity must be narrowly construed arose is a
hotly debated topic in legal academic circles."8 But there is little
argument that the Supreme Court recognized that waivers of sovereign
immunity must be narrowly construed in 1927 in EasternTransportation
Co. v. United States.5 9 The court stated the following: "The sovereignty
of the United States raises a presumption against its suability, unless
it is clearly shown; nor should a court enlarge its liability to suit
conferred beyond what the language requires."' By 1931, the Court
recognizd the idea that the United States could not be sued without its
consent was "well established." 1

56. Kardon, supra note 46, at 756-57 ("[The Court's methods in Chao point toward a
possible decision in favor of the narrow reading of actual damages should the Cooper
question reach the Court, a real possibility given the circuit split and Judge O'Scannlain's
strong dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc in Cooper.").
57. Doe, 540 U.S. at 627 n.12.
The Courts of Appeals are divided on the precise definition of actual damages.
Compare Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 331 (C.A.11 1982) (actual damages are
restricted to pecuniary loss), with Johnson v. Department of Treasury, IRS, 700
F.2d 971,972-74 (C-A.5 1983) (actual damages can cover adequately demonstrated
mental anxiety even without any out-of-pocket loss). That issue is not before us,
however, since the petition for certiorari did not raise it for our review. We
assume without deciding that the Fourth Circuit was correct to hold that Doe's
complaints in this case did not rise to the level of alleging actual damages. We
do not suggest that out-of-pocket expenses are necessary for recovery of the $1,000
minimum; only that they suffice to qualify under any view of actual damages.
Id.
58. Timothy J. Simeone, Rule 11 and Federal Sovereign Immunity: Respecting the
Explicit WaiverRequirement, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (1993) ("The early history of
federal sovereign immunity in the United States remains the subject of considerable
academic debate.").
59. 272 U.S. 675 (1927).
60. Id. at 686.
61. United States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656, 659 (1931) (citing E. Transp. Co., 272 U.S.
at 686; Price v. U.S., 174 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1899)) ("But it is also well established that suit
may not be maintained against the United States in any case not clearly within the terms
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Though a few cases dealt specifically with the narrow construction of
sovereign immunity, arguably, the construction fell into disuse62 until
its surprising revival in 1992 with the decision in United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc." Nordic Village was a bankruptcy case in which
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code did not waive sovereign immunity.6 The Court held
that because the language of section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code was
ambiguous, Congress's intent was unclear. 5 Specifically, the Court
stated the waiver has to be "unequivocally expressed" to be effective.66
Justice Stevens's dissent argued that Scalia's reasoning was questionable
and lamented the fact that the Court overly burdened Congress to be so
specific in its lawmaking. 7
Justice Stevens's dissent was not heeded four years later when the
Court used Scalia's narrow approach again in Lane v. Pena." In an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, citing Nordic Village, the Court opined that
the "firmly grounded" precedent that "[a] waiver of the Federal
Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in
statutory text."6 9
Interestingly, the Court strayed from Scalia's interpretation in its
2002 decision, Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff.7 Richlin, a case
concerning the recovery of legal fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act (EAJA),71 was decided just a few months before Cooper was decided
in the district court.72 The unanimous opinion in Richlin considered
legislative history, interpretations from previous cases, and policy

of the statute by which it consents to be sued.").
62. Kardon, supra note 46, at 720 ("In 1989, Professor Cass Sunstein classified narrow
construction of federal sovereign immunity waivers as 'obsolete' in his taxonomy
of
canons.").

63. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
64. Id. at 39 ("Neither § 106(c) nor any other provision of law establishes
an
unequivocal textual waiver of the Government's immunity from a bankruptcy
trustee's
claims for monetary relief. Since Congress has not empowered a bankruptcy court
to order
a recovery of money from the United States, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
must
be reversed.").
65. Id. at 34.
66. Id. at 33 (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)).
67. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[One must ask what valid reason supports
a
construction of the waiver in § 106(c) that is so 'strict' that the Court will not even
examine
its legislative history.").
68. 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
69. Id. at 192.
70. 553 U.S. 571 (2008).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006).
72. Richlin, 553 U.S. at 573.
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arguments to clarify the ambiguity of the EAJA, instead of the sovereign
immunity canon.7 3 In fact, the Court saw "no need ... to resort to the
sovereign immunity canon," stating "[tihe ... canon is just that-a
canon of construction."74 The case further stated that the canon is
simply "a tool for interpreting the law" and that this Court "ha[s] never
that it displaces the other traditional tools of statutory construcheld 75
tion."
One further consideration concerning statutory construction is that
some scholars believe stare decisis does not apply when judges consider
using a canon.76 Thus, when looking at the different application of the
canon of sovereign immunity in Richlin and Nordic Village, the Court
could choose to apply either Nordic Village's narrow construction, or the
broader construction of Richlin. However, the Court is bound by neither
decision.
IV.
A.

COURT'S RATIONALE

Majority Opinion

Justice Alito first addressed whether sovereign immunity was waived
by the Privacy Act's civil remedies provision and how broad that waiver
is.7 7 Justice Alito quoted Lane v. Pena78 and United States v. Nordic
Village,79 stating that the waiver of immunity must be "'unequivocally
expressed' in [the] statutory text."8 0 He used the "sovereign immunity
canon," stating that if the "'traditional tools of statutory construction"'
do not resolve ambiguity in the statute, other means can be used.8'
However, Justice Alito argued that it is not whether the Privacy Act's
civil remedies provision actually waived sovereign immunity, but how
broad that waiver is, specifically, the term "actual damages" within the
statute.8 2 In fact, "actual damages" remains the focus of the opinion,

73. Id. at 589-90.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 589.
76. Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1872 (2008) ("Many scholars have asserted in passing
that courts do not give doctrines of statutory interpretation stare decisis effect without
engaging in any further analysis.").
77. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012).
78. 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
79. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
80. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1448 (quoting Lane, 518 U.S. at 192).
81. Id. (quoting Richlin, 553 U.S. at 589).
82. Id.
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as well as interpreting whether Congress meant to include nonpecuniary harm in the waiver of immunity.
Justice Alito used various sources to evaluate what "actual damages"
meant because Congress did not define it. 3 He rejected Cooper's
argument to use the ordinary meaning of the word actual, citing the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's explanation that
"actual damages" is a legal term'of art which brings with it a "cluster
of
ideas."s ' Yet, the "cluster of ideas" was unclear, and after Justice Alito
consulted Black's Law Dictionary and found no help, he turned to other
cases in which the term had been interpreted.'
Justice Alito further recognized that the term had been determined to
include non-pecuniary harm. In interpreting both the Fair Housing Act
(FHA) s6 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), s7 courts have
included damages for mental and emotional distress as "actual damages."' He acknowledged, however, that equally as many cases have
denied relief for non-pecuniary harm under the term. 9 With this
inconclusive support, and the fact that the term has a "chameleon-like
quality," Justice Alito considered the context Congress relied upon when
using the term.90
Justice Alito posited that the context is similar to defamation and
privacy torts because such actions are what the Privacy Act was
designed to protect.9 1 He looked to a past ruling on the Privacy Act,

83. Id. at 1448-50.
84. Id. at 1449 ("[Wlhen

Congress employs a term of art, 'it presumably knows and
adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it was taken.'" (quoting Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307
(1992))).

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1449-50.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1449 (citing Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 636-38

(7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973); Thompson

v. San Antonio Retail Merchs. Ass'n, 682 F.2d 509, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1982); Millstone v.
O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 834-35 (8th Cir. 1976)). All of these cases were
considered as having granted relief for non-pecuniary loss under the term "actual
damages." Id. at 1449.
89. Id. at 1449-50 (citing Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d
505, 512 (9th Cir. 1985); Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002); Ryan v.

Foster & Marshall, Inc., 556 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1977); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107,
111 (2d Cir. 1981); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970)). All of these
cases were considered as having denied relief for non-pecuniary loss under the term "actual
damages." Id. at 1449-50.
90. Id. at 1450.
91. Id.
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Doe v. Chao,9 2 which stated the civil suit provision was very similar to
the common law torts of libel per quod and slander.9" Those two
common law torts require proof of "special damages"-imited to
pecuniary loss-to allow "general damages"--non-pecuniary loss. 4
Justice Alito stated that Congress may have relied on that fact when
using the term "actual damages" and strengthens his argument by
pointing to cases where the terms special and actual have been used
interchangeably.95 He dispelled any doubt by citing an uncodified
section of the Privacy Act establishing the Privacy Protection Study
Commission, which found that the Privacy Act does not allow liability for
general damages and solidified the two terms (special and general
damages) as mutually exclusive.96 He opined that although the United
States Supreme Court is not bound by the Commission's results, he
found the conclusions of the report to be helpful.97
Finally, Justice Alito responded to Cooper's final argument-that by
disallowing non-pecuniary results, a person with minor financial loss
would recover at least $1,000, while those with significant mental or
emotional distress would get nothing, thus leading to an absurd
result.9" Justice Alito denied the validity of this argument and stated
there is nothing absurd about putting limits on relief available from the
government. 99

Justice Sotomayor's Dissent
Justice Sotomayor focused on "the Act's core purpose" of preventing
violations of privacy by the government.'0 0 She prefaced her opinion
with a quip at the majority opinion, countering Justice Alito's rationale
with the claim that common sense and the Court's precedent dictates a
different result: affirming the Ninth Circuit ruling. 01 She claimed the
B.

92.

540 U.S. 614 (2004).

93. Id. at 1451.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 1451-52 (citing Wetzel v. Gulf Oil Corp., 455 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 1972);
Elec. Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research Corp., 325 F.2d 761, 765 (6th Cir. 1963);
M & S Furniture Sales Co. v. Edward J. De Bartolo Corp., 241 A.2d 126, 128 (1968);
Clementson v. Minn. Tribune Co., 47 N.W. 781, 781 (Minn. 1891)).
96. Id. at 1452-53.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1455.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1456 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1456.
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Court's ruling severely debilitates the act and the ability of people to

02
recover under it. 1

Justice Sotomayor began by analyzing the majority's reasoning,
stating that even Justice Alito does not find the respondent's argument
concerning "actual damages" impossible to believe,"0 3 but because the
term is ambiguous, the "canon of sovereign immunity" dictates that the
term must be narrowly construed. 0 4 Instead, Justice Sotomayor
turned to Richlin Security Service v. Chertoff,' which the majority
cited, to advocate using the statute's history, text, and context to
determine Congress's intent concerning actual damages.'
She first
stated that the "canon simply cannot bear the weight" Justice Alito gives
10 7

to it.

Then, citing Justice Stevens's dissent in United States v.

Nordic Village,' Justice Sotomayor stated that the canon of construction is only used when it is convenient for the justices, instead of being
used on a consistent, methodical basis."0 9 She warned the Court may
have gone too far in this case, "'import[ing] immunity'" where Congress
meant to waive it."0
Justice Sotomayor then began building her own case for interpreting
the civil damages provision of the Privacy Act. She agreed with the
majority that one must first begin with the language of the statute."'
But instead of rejecting the plain meaning, she found it to be "plain
enough."" 2 She further claimed that Black's Law Dictionary's definition"' was adopted by the Court more than 100 years ago in Birdsall
v. Coolidge,"' a case cited by the respondent and rejected by the

102. Id.
103. Id. (stating that Justice Alito "considers [the respondent's] reading of 'actual
damages' to be 'plausible'").
104. Id.
105. 553 U.S. 571 (2008).
106. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1456.
107. Id.
108. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
109. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1456-57.
110. Id. at 1457 (quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955)).
111. Id.
112. Id. (stating "There is nothing circular about [Black's] definition [of actual
damages].").
113. Id. at 1458 (quoting Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 64 (1876)) ("'[Clompensatory
damages and actual damages mean the same thing; that is, that the damages shall be the
result of the injury alleged and proved, and that the amount awarded shall be precisely
commensurate with the injury suffered.'").
114. 93 U.S. 64 (1876).
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majority.115 She pointed out that the definition used by the Court in
1876 is the same used in current legal dictionaries.'
Next, Justice Sotomayor examined the Privacy Act itself to analyze the
majority's context argument. Using her primary rationale, she explained
that the narrow reading of actual damages is inconsistent with the
Privacy Act's main purpose of protecting citizens from an unwanted
intrusion by the government." 7 She also noted that the majority's
reading creates a "disconnect" between the Privacy Act's remedies and
And although she accepted the majority's
the substantive text."'
interpretation of the substantive provisions-mainly that they draw on
the torts of privacy and defamation-she believed the Court relied too
much on Doe and its decision that the torts parallel the Privacy Act and
therefore the remedies should also parallel each other."9 She accused
the majority of essentially rewriting the Privacy Act by interpreting
actual damages to mean special damages. 2 '
Third, Justice Sotomayor stated that the majority again misinterpreted evidence of congressional intent when it claimed that the reason
Congress did not allow "general damages" to be used in the bill meant
that it did not want to allow "actual damages" to be recovered.' 2 '
Instead, Justice Sotomayor said the omission of general damages from
the bill signals that Congress meant to incorporate all damages under
the term "actual damages."122
Finally, Justice Sotomayor concluded her argument with the cornerstone of her opinion-that the majority's reading is inconsistent with the
Privacy Act's purpose. 2 3 She opined that in every statutory interpretation case, one must consider Congress's purpose. 24 She examined
the history surrounding the passage of the Privacy Act-the scandal
surrounding Watergate and the surveillance of individuals by the
government without their knowledge-to determine what Congress

115. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1458; Brief for the Respondent at 8, Fed. Aviation Admin.
v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012) (No. 10-1024), 2011 WL 4520531, at *8.
116. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1458.
117. Id. at 1459.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1459-60.
120. Id. at 1460 ("[Substituting words] is precisely what the majority does when it
rewrites 'actual damages' to mean 'special damages.'").
121. Id. at 1460-61.
122. Id. at 1461.
123. Id. at 1462.
124. Id. (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979))
("I turn finally to the statute's purpose, for '[a]s in all cases of statutory interpretation, our
task is to interpret the words of th[e] statut[e] in light of the purposes Congress sought to
serve.'").
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intended. 25 She said that Congress's intent in allowing recovery for
the government's intrusion is "unmistakabl[e]. " 126 She concluded by
stating that the Court's blatant disregard for the actual text of the
Privacy Act creates a result that allows recovery for a "$5 hit to the
pocketbook" but not debilitating mental distress. 2 7
V.

IMPLICATIONS

A. Disconnect: InhibitingRecovery for Privacy Violations as Privacy
Concerns Grow
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor introduces what this decision means
for the Privacy Act going forward. Using strong language, she says that
the remedies provision of the Act is rendered "impotent" by the
majority's decision.128 She is not alone in her opinion. Justice Ginsberg, in her dissent in Doe v. Chao,'29 noted that the Privacy Act
violations normally cause fear and anxiety-injuries difficult to calculate
in monetary figures.3 ° But by disallowing recovery for those types of
injuries, a complainant is left with limited recourse, if any at all. And
as Cooper proves, government agencies will have little reason to respect
the privacy rights of citizens, the proof of which has already been shown
in the instant case.
However, the erosion of protection under the Privacy Act was not
sudden; its power has diminished over the past several years. Since the
2004 decision of Doe, some authors have lamented the inability to
recover under the Privacy Act for the types of damages normally
incurred from an invasion of privacy claim. 3' One author observed
that without the accountability that the Privacy Act's civil remedies
provision provides, citizens are "simply unaware of their privacy rights
and the existence of records kept" on them.'32 An inability to recover
under the Privacy Act would allow agencies to share important
125. Id. ("The historical context of the Act is important to an understanding of its

remedial purposes. In 1974, Congress was concerned with curbing the illegal surveillance
and investigation of individuals by federal agencies that had been exposed during the
Watergate scandal.'" (quoting OFFICE OF PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES, OVERVIEW OF THE
PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 4 (2010))).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1463.
128. FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1463 (2012).
129. 530 U.S. 614 (2004).
130. Id. at 634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. See generally Kardon, supra note 46, at 767; Hong, supra note 45, at 102 ("Doe v.
Chao effectively dismantled the private enforcement mechanism of the Privacy Act.").
132. Hong, supra note 45, at 102.
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information, including private blogs, medical records, financial records,
and social security numbers, with little fear of recourse from the civil
remedies provision.
In the summer session of the 112th Congress, just a few months after
the Cooper decision, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
echoed these concerns in a report to Congress.' 33 The report stated
that the Privacy Act may be inadequate in its goal to protect citizens'
34
privacy because technology has progressed so much since 1974.1 It
cited previous GAO reports detailing how technologies "such as web logs
('blogs'), social networking websites, video-and multimedia-sharing
sites, and 'wikis"' do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Privacy Act as
they are not systems of the federal government.'3 5 The GAO has also
issued several recent reports detailing the need for Congress to protect
privacy in the realm of social media.3 6 Coincidentally, eight agencies
had not followed the Privacy Act's requirements in their use of collected
information from social media sites, even when the agencies obtained
it.'

37

For example, the report mentioned that the Department of

Homeland Security uses a process called "data mining" to determine
138
hidden patterns to counteract terrorism within the United States.
However, as data mining does not constitute "records" as it is defined
of personal information is not
under the Privacy Act, this collection
39
actionable under the Privacy Act.

Between a combination of advancing technology and the United States
Supreme Court's narrow reading of the enforcement provisions, the
Privacy Act's power has diminished, even as technology becomes more
pervasive and more advanced. In fact, the U.S. government is the
largest collector of personal information, with one federal agency

133. U.S. Gov'T

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-961-T, PRIVACY: FEDERAL LAW

SHOULD BE UPDATED TO ADDRESS CHANGING TECHNOLOGY LANDSCAPE (2012).

134. Id. at 5.
135. Id.
136. See generallyU.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1O-872T, INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT: CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL AGENCIES' USE OF WEB 2.0 TECHNOLOGIES

(2010); Memorandum M-10-23 from Dir. of Office of Mgmt. & Budget to the heads of Exec.
Dep'ts & Agencies (June 25, 2010) (on file with author); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-11-605, SOCIAL MEDIA: FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES FOR MANAGING AND PROTECTING INFORMATION THEY ACCESS AND DISSEMINATE (2011).

137.

U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 133, at 5 ("A number of agencies

had not updated their privacy policies or conducted PIAs relative to their use of third-party
services such as Facebook and Twitter.").

138. Id. at 6-7.
139. Id.
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maintaining records on more than 290 million people. 4 ° And as
Cooper demonstrates, health and medical records are now also threatened, which was recently analyzed by another Supreme Court decision,
National Federationof Independent Business v. Sebelius."'
B.

Privacy Violations and Medical Records
Sebelius was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court. The decision
affirmed the constitutionality of several key provisions of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act

42

passed by Congress in 2008.143

One law professor noted this problem the week after the opinion was
published, stating:
Even as the Supreme Court and the nation focused unprecedented
attention on the issue of health care and the constitutionality of the
landmark Affordable Care Act last week, the Court issued an unrelated
ruling with a much more immediate and personal impact on health
care, specifically whether the sharing of information by government
agencies about
an individual's health records violates the Federal
144

Privacy Act.

The possibilities of sharing information between agencies, particularly
health records, have already been realized in the past two years. In
August 2011, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
denied a request from Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York to prevent
the use of food stamps when purchasing soft drinks in a controversial
experiment. 4 ' The mayor's office cited how consumption of sugary
drinks has a strong correlation to diabetes and obesity.'46 The mayor's
office further recognized how these conditions are especially prevalent
147

in low-income residents-residents more reliant on food stamps.

140. GOVERNMENTAL AccOUNTABLITy OFFICE, GAO-03-304, PRIVACY ACT: OMB
LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO IMPROvE AGENCY COMPLIANCE 13 (2003) ("The median number of

people ... maintained in the ... system of records [is] about 3,500, but this number
varied.., from 5 people to about 290 million people.").

141. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
142. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, Stat. 119

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
143. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607-09.
144. Alex Wohl, Opinion Analysis: The Court's Privacy Act Standard-Neither
Inconceivable Nor Implausible, ScoTus BLOG (Apr. 2, 2012, 9:17 AM), http://www.scotus

blog.com/?p=142392.
145. Patrick McGeehan, U.S. Rejects Mayor's Plan to Ban Use of Food Stamps to Buy
Soda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/nyregion/ban-on-

using-food-stamps-to-buy-soda-rejected-by-usda.html.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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The USDA rejected the idea on the basis that the project would be
difficult to monitor logistically,148 but the question remains as to
whether these hurdles will disappear as technology grows. Already, with
the advent of Electronic Benefit Transfer cards, technology could easily
monitor exactly what products were purchased and by whom.' 49 That
information could then be shared with other government departments,
like the SSA, to determine health and dietary patterns and whether
someone on the state health plan experienced better or worse health.
C. Privacy Violations and the Social Security Number
This idea may seem far-fetched, but in Cooper, the SSA readily shared
its health records with the DOT to determine whether pilots were
healthy enough to fly.'50 In fact, the SSA and DOT used another
important personal record to cross reference medical records-Cooper's
social security number. The social security number is the de facto
national identification number, connecting a person's financial information, taxes, medical records, educational records, and other personal
information together.'' It is arguably the most valuable piece of
information about a person. The unauthorized disclosure of the social
security number, which the SSA and DOT did in Cooper, can lead to
another serious problem, identity theft.
Identify theft is a problem for millions of Americans each year.' 2
A GAO report found that "as many as 10 million people-or 4.6 percent
of the U.S. adult population-discover that they are victims" of identity
theft.5 3 Additionally, these thefts cost upwards of $50 billion per

148. Id.
149. For more information, see regulations related to the food stamps Electronic
Benefits Transfer (EBT) program at 7 C.F.R. § 274.10. For a general overview and advent
of EBT, see Kathryn O'Neill Pulliam, Muddying the Water: Electronic Benefits Transfer
After the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 515, 517 (1998). See also David
J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BRoOK. L. REV. 231, 251-52
(1998) (noting that it would be easy for the government to track purchases in the future
with the use of EBT cards and the accounts connected with them).
150. See generally Cooper, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
151. Hong, supra note 45, at 107 ("Like it or not, the social security number is the
universal identifier for individuals. Because of the widespread use of the social security
number as an identifier by the government and private companies, individuals' complete
financial, medical, credit, and other vital information is linked to the social security
number.").
152. U.S. Govr AcCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-961T, IDENTITY THEFT:
GOVERNMENTS HAVE ACTED TO PROTECT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION, BUT
VULNERABILITIES REMAIN 3 (2009) ("Millions of people become victims of identity theft each
year.").
153. Id.
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year.1 14 Notably, most of these victims did not suffer monetary harm,
but instead suffered from loss of time in dealing with problems
associated with identity theft such as "bounced checks, loan denials,
credit card application rejections, debt collection harassment, insurance
rejections, and the shut-down of utilities."'55 And as one author has
observed, identity theft will only grow as a "majority of government
agencies use electronic records' containing the social security number."'56 Under the Cooper decision, recovery would be unavailable for
a person who suffered identity theft due to government mismanagement
of personal information, including their social security number, for any
of the harms listed above.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It would seem to most that the only way to remedy the inability to
recover for privacy violations between agencies would be to rewrite the
Privacy Act to adapt to the rapidly changing world of technology.
Congress simply defining actual damages would be enough to broaden
recovery under the act from the extremely narrow waiver of sovereign
immunity just recognized. And as Alex Kardon pointed out in his
evaluation of the current damages provisions under the Privacy Act:
"The world has not changed so much since the days of Watergate that
the government should once again be given free rein to use personal
information with no fear of repercussions....",'
Whether Cooper was the death knell of the Privacy Act remains a
question for the future, but the decision definitely makes recovery for an
invasion of privacy by a government agency extremely difficult, if not
impossible. And what is worse, if the government cannot be held
accountable for its invasions, what is to stop it from sharing more
privileged information in the future? Congress should take heed of the
worries of its citizens once more and update the Privacy Act to provide
the protections it once did.
S. JACOB CARROLL

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Hong, supra note 45, at 107-08.
Id. at 108.
Kardon, supra note 46, at 767.

